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Interests of the Amicus Curiae1 
 
 Amici are diverse health care provider organizations representing 
millions of doctors, nurses and other health care professionals throughout the 
country. Amici believe that the Affordable Care Act is a significant 
achievement for the patients that their members serve because it ensures 
greater protection against losing or being denied health insurance coverage 
and it promotes better access to primary care and to wellness and prevention 
programs. The Act’s goal of optimizing health insurance coverage for the 
greatest number of people permits healthcare professionals to place their 
attention on the most important thing—the patient’s well-being and 
healing—rather than on economic considerations. 
Amici have a significant interest in assisting the Court in 
understanding that the minimum coverage provision challenged by plaintiffs 
is essential to the Affordable Care Act's provisions ensuring that health 
insurance is both universally available and affordable. Because amici’s 
members work on the front lines of the health care system, they know from 
                                                 
1
 This brief is filed with the consent of the parties pursuant to Federal Rule 
of Appellate Procedure 29(a). Pursuant to Federal Rule of Appellate 
Procedure 29(c)(5), counsel for amici represent that no counsel for a party 
authored this brief in whole or in part and that none of the parties or their 
counsel, nor any other person or entity other than amici, its members or its 
counsel, made a monetary contribution intended to fund the preparation or 
submission of this brief. 
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experience that patients who put off needed care due to lack of insurance 
often end up sicker and require much costlier emergency room care.  
Moreover, amici’s members work throughout the continuum of care and in 
all settings within the health care industry—from direct care to hospital 
administration.  As a result, amici have a uniquely broad perspective on the 
impact of the Affordable Care Act and the capacity to offer information that 
can guide the court’s understanding of the consequences of removing the 
minimum coverage provision to the health provider, patients, and insurance 
markets as a whole. 
ARGUMENT 
 
Congress enacted the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub 
L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) ("ACA") to achieve near-universal 
health insurance coverage, significantly reduce the economic costs of poor 
outcomes among presently uninsured Americans, prevent cost shifting from 
uninsured Americans receiving uncompensated care to Americans with 
insurance, and improve the financial security of all families against medical 
costs.  § 10106(a).  Yet, as Congress determined in enacting the ACA, the 
reforms enacted to achieve these goals cannot function effectively without a 
provision requiring all Americans who can afford insurance to either obtain 
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it or pay an additional portion of their income with their annual tax return.2  
§ 1501(a)(2)(G).  Because Congress possesses the constitutional authority to 
prevent a comprehensive economic regulatory scheme from being so 
undermined, the minimum coverage provision should be upheld.  See 
Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 22 (2005) (holding that courts should "refuse 
to excise individual components" of a larger regulatory scheme even when 
those components could not be enacted on their own under the Commerce 
Clause). 
A. The Necessary and Proper Clause Empowers Congress to Enact 
Provisions That Are Reasonably Adapted To Making A Broader 
Regulatory Scheme Effective 
 
 “[T]he Necessary and Proper Clause makes clear that the 
Constitution’s grants of specific federal legislative authority are 
accompanied by broad power to enact laws that are ‘convenient, or useful’ 
or ‘conducive’” to an enumerated power’s “beneficial exercise.”  United 
States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949, 1956 (2010) (quoting McCulloch v. 
Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 413, 418 (1819)).  Moreover, “Chief 
Justice Marshall emphasized that the word ‘necessary’ does not mean 
‘absolutely necessary.’” Id.  Rather, “[I]n determining whether the 
                                                 
2
 The ACA labels this provision the "Requirement to Maintain Minimum 
Essential Coverage."  § 1501.  The provision is referred to as the "minimum 
coverage provision" throughout this brief.  
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Necessary and Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to 
enact a particular federal statute, [courts] look to see whether the statute 
constitutes a means that is rationally related to the implementation of a 
constitutionally enumerated power.” United States v. Belfast, 611 F.3d 783, 
805 (11th Cir. 2010) ((quoting Comstock, 130 S.Ct. at 1956) (emphasis in 
original)). 
 Plaintiffs attempt to draw a distinction between laws regulating 
"activity" and laws supposedly regulating "inactivity" under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, claiming that the ACA’s minimum coverage provision is 
flawed because it regulates a failure to act in the health care market.  
Significantly, plaintiffs are unable to cite a single case interpreting the 
Necessary and Proper Clause which supports this novel, extra-constitutional 
distinction—and no such case exists.3  As Justice Scalia explains, "where 
Congress has the authority to enact a regulation of interstate commerce, 'it 
possesses every power needed to make that regulation effective.'"  Raich, 
545 U.S. at 36 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (quoting United States 
v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 118 (1942)) (emphasis added). 
                                                 
3
 Moreover, plaintiffs’ claim that uninsured patients do not participate in the 
health care market reflects a flawed understanding of that market.  See 
generally Brief of Amici Curiae Economic Scholars. 
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Amici acknowledge that, while Congress’ Necessary and Proper 
power is very broad, it is not without limits.  When invoked as part of a 
comprehensive economic regulatory scheme, the Necessary and Proper 
power “can only be exercised in conjunction with congressional regulation 
of an interstate market, and it extends only to those measures necessary to 
make interstate regulation effective.”  Id. at 38 (Scalia, J, concurring in the 
judgment).  These conditions are met in this case, as the minimum coverage 
provision is necessary to make the related insurance reforms effective.  
When Congress enacts a unique regulatory scheme or regulates a unique 
market under its Commerce Power, the very uniqueness of such a law may 
bring new regulatory tools within the Necessary and Proper Clause’s 
umbrella. 
The Necessary and Proper Clause also empowers Congress to ensure 
that federal monies are not spent wastefully.  In Sabri v. United States, 541 
U.S. 600 (2004), the Supreme Court upheld a wide-reaching statute 
criminalizing bribery of any state official whose agency or government 
receives federal funds, even though the statute swept broadly to include 
officials who have no contact with the federal funds.  As the Court 
explained, "Congress has authority under the Spending Clause to appropriate 
federal monies to promote the general welfare, and it has corresponding 
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authority under the Necessary and Proper Clause to see to it that taxpayer 
dollars" are not "frittered away" by bribery-motivated projects that are not 
cost-effective.  Id. at 605 (citations omitted). 
B. The Minimum Coverage Provision is "Reasonably Adapted" To 
Congress' Legitimate Ends Of Regulating Interstate Commerce in 
the Health Market and Ensuring that Federal Health Care 
Spending is Not Wasted 
 
 To accomplish its goals of improving health outcomes, extending 
insurance coverage and promoting financial security against health costs, the 
ACA creates an interconnected network of subsidies and regulations.  Most 
notably, the Act prohibits insurers from denying coverage to consumers with 
preexisting conditions or charging them higher premiums, ACA § 2704, and 
it provides tax subsidies for insurance coverage to individuals with incomes 
between 133% and 400% of the poverty line.  § 1401–02, 2001.  Without the 
minimum coverage provision, these two provisions will be severely 
undermined.  Rather than ensuring equal access to insurance for Americans 
with disabilities or preexisting conditions, the ACA's preexisting conditions 
provision would threaten the nationwide individual insurance market if it 
does not take effect in conjunction with a minimum coverage provision.  
Likewise, the generous subsidies offered by the ACA will diminish 
drastically in value absent a minimum coverage provision. 
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1. Removing The Minimum Coverage Provision Would 
Drive Up The Costs of Care For The Uninsured and 
Shift These Costs To Persons With Insurance 
 
 Many health conditions and illnesses, if caught early and treated with 
appropriate follow-up care, can be relatively inexpensive to resolve.  Many 
conditions can be avoided altogether through preventive care.  Yet if these 
conditions or illnesses do not receive prompt and appropriate treatment, they 
can often require hospitalization or otherwise deteriorate into a serious 
condition requiring expensive care.  See Institute of Medicine, Health 
Insurance is a Family Matter 106 (2002).  Because federal law requires 
virtually all emergency rooms to stabilize patients regardless of their ability 
to pay, see Emergency Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 
1395dd., the cost of this expensive care winds up being transferred to 
patients with insurance or to government programs such as Medicare or 
Medicaid.  Accordingly the minimum coverage provision is reasonably 
adapted to ensuring that government health care spending is not “frittered 
away” on preventable health care costs.  Sabri, 541 U.S. at 605. 
 The likelihood that a patient will receive adequate preventive care or 
early treatment is directly related to whether the patient is insured.  One 
study determined that children enrolled in a public health insurance plan 
were 15 percentage points more likely to receive preventive care than those 
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who were not.  Institute of Medicine, America’s Uninsured Crisis: 
Consequences for Health and Health Care 61 (February 2009) (“Uninsured 
Crisis”).  Likewise, multiple studies found that uninsured children are "less 
likely to be up-to-date on their immunizations than insured children, 
controlling for observed characteristics of the children." Id.  Use of dental 
services also increases between 16 and 40 percentage points among children 
who are insured.  Id. at 62. 
 The data for adult patients is ever starker: 
[C]hronically ill adults who lacked health insurance had five to 
nine fewer health care visits per year than chronically ill adults 
who have health insurance. Uninsured adults with chronic 
illnesses were much more likely than their insured peers to go 
without any medical visits during the year—even when they 
were diagnosed with serious conditions such as asthma (23.4 of 
uninsured adults with no visits vs. 6.2 percent of insured 
adults), COPD (13.2 vs. 4.0 percent), depression (19.3 vs. 5.2 
percent), diabetes (11.0 vs. 5.2 percent), heart disease (8.7 vs. 
2.9 percent), or hypertension (12.7 vs. 5.3 percent). 
Similarly, uninsured adults with asthma, cancer, COPD, 
diabetes, heart disease, or hypertension are at least twice as 
likely as their insured peers to say that they were unable to 
receive or had to delay receiving a needed prescription[.] 
Id. at 65.  Likewise, routine preventive care such as "mammography, Pap 
testing, cholesterol testing, and influenza vaccination" is far less common 
among adults who experience frequent periods of uninsurance.  Id.  While 
women who are consistently insured have a 76.7 percent chance of receiving 
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mammographies, that chance declines to 34.7 percent for women who 
experience frequent periods of uninsurance.  Id.   Uninsured adults are also 
much less likely to have a continuing relationship with a single provider.  
Among uninsured adults, "19 percent with heart disease, 14 percent with 
hypertension, and 26 percent with arthritis do not have a regular source of 
care, compared with 8, 4, and 7 percent, respectively, of their insured 
counterparts."  Institute of Medicine, Care Without Coverage: Too Little, 
Too Late 29 (2002) ("Care Without Coverage").  This disparity is troubling 
because patients with chronic conditions often must "modify[] their 
behavior, monitor[] their condition and participat[e] in treatment regimens" 
in order to keep their condition under control.  Id. at 57.  Such tasks require 
patients to develop a complex understanding of their condition and to master 
tasks that do not come naturally to persons without education or training in 
the health sciences.  Thus, a patient's continuing relationship with a single 
provider who can answer their questions and monitor their care is "a key to 
high-quality health care" for persons with chronic conditions.  Id.   
 There is robust data demonstrating that uninsured patients' diminished 
access to care causes their medical conditions to deteriorate.  One study 
found that "near-elderly adults who lost their insurance were subsequently 
82 percent more likely than those who kept their private insurance to report a 
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decline in overall health."  J. Michael McWilliams, Health Consequences of 
Uninsurance Among Adults in the United States: Recent Evidence and 
Implications, 87 Milbank Q. 443, 469 (2009) ("Uninsurance Among 
Adults").  The rate of asthma-related hospital stays for children with asthma 
in New York dropped from 11.1 percent to 3.4 percent when those children 
were enrolled in a state insurance program.  Peter G. Szilagyi, et al., 
Improved Asthma Care After Enrollment in the State Children's Health 
Insurance Program in New York, 117 Pediatrics 486, 491 (2006).  Uninsured 
children diagnosed with diabetes are "more likely to present with severe and 
life-threatening diabetic ketoacidosis" than insured children with the same 
condition.  Uninsured Crisis at 71.  Among stroke patients, "[t]he mortality 
risk of uninsured patients was 24% to 56% higher than that of their privately 
insured peers for acute hemorrhagic and acute ischemic stroke, 
respectively."  Jay J. Shen and Elmer L. Washington, Disparities in 
Outcomes Among Patients With Stroke Associated With Insurance Status, 38 
Stroke 1010, 1013 (2007).  Likewise, "5-year survival rates for uninsured 
adults were significantly lower than for privately insured adults diagnosed 
with breast or colorectal cancer—two prevalent cancers for which there are 
not only effective screening tests, but also treatments demonstrated to 
improve survival."  Uninsured Crisis at 78.  Indeed, a recent Institute of 
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Medicine report documented dozens of empirical studies linking 
uninsurance with poor health outcomes and deteriorated medical conditions.  
See generally Uninsured Crisis. 
 When uninsured patients fail to receive preventive care, continuing 
care or early treatment, their healthcare needs and the cost of meeting those 
needs still require them to participate in the health care market.  As a 
condition of their hospital's participation in Medicare, hospital emergency 
departments must stabilize any patent who seeks treatment for an emergency 
medical condition regardless of the patient's ability to pay.  See Emergency 
Medical Treatment and Labor Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd.  Thus, an uninsured 
patient whose condition deteriorates because they are unable to afford less 
expensive preventive or early care will nonetheless receive expensive 
emergency treatment for that condition.  See Care Without Coverage at 58 
(indicating that many uninsured patients "identify an emergency department 
as their regular source of care").  The cost of this uncompensated care is then 
distributed to other patients or to government health programs such as 
Medicare or Medicaid.  According to one study, this cost shifting adds, on 
average, $410 to each individual insurance premium and $1,100 to each 
family premium.  Ben Furnas & Peter Harbage, Ctr. for Am. Progress, The 
Cost-Shift from the Uninsured 2 (March 24, 2009) (“Cost-Shift”).  
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 Uninsured patients' likelihood to delay care and the subsequent 
deterioration of health also drive up Medicare costs.  A twelve-year study of 
patients approaching the age of Medicare eligibility found that previously 
uninsured patients with cardiovascular disease (hypertension, heart disease, 
or stroke) or diabetes often did not receive widely-available and effective 
treatments to prevent costly complications if their conditions developed 
before they qualified for Medicare.  As a result, "previously uninsured 
Medicare beneficiaries with these conditions reported 13 percent more 
doctor visits, 20 percent more hospitalizations, and 51 percent more total 
medical expenditures" than similarly situated patients who were insured 
prior to qualifying for Medicare.  Uninsurance Among Adults at 468. 
 Congress may, through the valid exercise of its spending power, 
require Medicare hospitals to accept uninsured patients into their emergency 
rooms as a condition of participation in the Medicare program.  The ACA's 
minimum coverage provision is reasonably adapted to preventing this 
requirement from driving up the cost of Medicare to taxpayers and 
increasing the cost of insurance for individual and families receiving 
subsidies under the ACA.  Accordingly, this provision should be upheld 
under Congress' Necessary and Proper power.  See Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 
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1957; Raich, 545 U.S. at 37 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment)); Sabri, 
541 U.S. at 604–08. 
2. Removing the Minimum Coverage Provision 
Drastically Reduces the Value of the ACA's Subsidies 
And Imperils the National Insurance Market 
 
 Adverse selection occurs when an individual "wait[s] to purchase 
health insurance until they need[] care," thus enabling them to receive 
benefits from an insurance plan that they have not previously contributed to.  
ACA § 10106(a).  The consequences of adverse selection is an insurance 
"death spiral" which can eventually collapse an insurance market.  See 
Thomas R. McLean, International Law, Telemedicine & Health Insurance: 
China as a Case Study, 32 Am. J. L. and Med. 7, 21 (2006) (“[A]dverse 
selection removes good-risk patients from the market, resulting in the need 
for insurers to raise their premiums; which triggers another round of adverse 
selection.”) 
 Insurers typically defend against adverse selection by screening 
potential customers with disabilities or preexisting conditions, but the ACA 
specifically forbids this practice.  § 2704.  Thus, the ACA requires most 
currently healthy Americans to participate in the insurance market to prevent 
them from strategically avoiding that market until they become ill or injured.  
§ 10106(a) ("[A minimum coverage provision] is essential to creating 
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effective health insurance markets in which improved health insurance 
products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of 
preexisting conditions can be sold.") 
 Because of this adverse selection problem, the Congressional Budget 
Office estimates that premiums will increase drastically absent a minimum 
coverage provision: 
CBO and [the Joint Committee on Taxation] estimate that, 
relative to current law, the elimination of the mandate would 
reduce insurance coverage among healthier people to a greater 
degree than it would reduce coverage among less healthy 
people. As a result, in the absence of a mandate, those who 
enroll would be less healthy, on average, than those enrolled 
with a mandate. This adverse selection would increase 
premiums for new non-group policies (purchased either in the 
exchanges or directly from insurers in the non-group market) 
by an estimated 15 to 20 percent relative to current law. 
Without the mandate, Medicaid enrollees would also have 
higher expected health spending, on average, than those 
enrolled under current law.  
 
Congressional Budget Office, Effects of Eliminating the Individual Mandate 
to Obtain Health Insurance 2 (June 16, 2010) ("Effects of Eliminating") 
(emphasis added); see also Jonathan Gruber, Ctr. for Am. Progress, Health 
Care Reform is a ‘Three-Legged Stool 1 (Aug. 5, 2010) (estimating that the 
average premium for a non-group health insurance plan would increase 27% 
by 2019 if the ACA goes into effect without a minimum coverage 
provision).   
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 If anything, this CBO estimate greatly underestimates the cost of 
excising the minimum coverage provision.  States which required insurers to 
cover individuals with preexisting conditions but did not enact a minimum 
coverage provision experienced far more drastic consequences than the 
premium spikes CBO predicts.  Kentucky, Maine, New Hampshire and 
Washington each lost most or all of their individual market insurers after 
those states enacted a preexisting conditions provision without enacting a 
minimum coverage provision, and the cost of some New Jersey health plans 
more than tripled after that state enacted a similar law.  See Vickie Yates 
Brown, et al., Health Care Reform in Kentucky - Setting the Stage for the 
Twenty-First Century?, 27 N. Ky. L. Rev. 319, 330 (2000) (“Health Care 
Reform in Kentucky”); Adele M. Kirk, Riding the Bull: Experience with 
Individual Market Reform in Washington, Kentucky and Massachusetts, 25 
J. of Health Politics, Pol'y and L. 133, 140, 152 (2000) (“Riding the Bull”); 
Maine Bureau of Insurance, White Paper: Maine's Individual Health 
Insurance Market 5, 8, (January 22, 2001) (“Maine’s Individual Health 
Insurance Market”), Alan C. Monheit et al., Community Rating and 
Sustainable Individual Health Insurance Markets in New Jersey, 23 Health 
Affairs 167, 169–70 (2004). 
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 As the experience of these states and the weight of economic evidence 
demonstrates, the minimum coverage provision is necessary to prevent the 
preexisting conditions provision from creating a fatal adverse selection 
spiral—and this is sufficient reason to uphold the minimum coverage 
provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause.  See Comstock, 130 S.Ct. 
at 1956.   
 Additionally, removing the minimum coverage provision would, in 
the words of Sabri, "fritter[] away" literally hundreds of billions of "taxpayer 
dollars."  541 U.S. at 605.  The Congressional Budget Office determined that 
eliminating the minimum coverage provision would increase the federal 
deficit by $252 billion between 2014 and 2020, with approximately 60 
percent of this additional debt stemming from increased health care costs.  
Effects of Eliminating at 1.  Yet while the federal government would spend 
hundreds of billions more without a minimum coverage provision, the nation 
would receive far less for its investment, as excising the minimum coverage 
provision "would increase the number of uninsured by about 16 million 
people, resulting in an estimated 39 million uninsured in 2019."  Id. at 2. 
 Because the minimum coverage provision is both necessary to ensure 
that the preexisting conditions provision is effective and essential to prevent 
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hundreds of billions of dollars from being "frittered away," it falls 
comfortably within Congress’ Necessary and Proper power. 
3. A Decision Upholding the Minimum Coverage 
Provision Would Not Justify the Hypothetical Federal 
Health Care Laws Suggested By Plaintiffs 
 
Plaintiffs claim that if the minimum coverage provision is upheld, 
“the federal government could mandate that we all join a health club and 
indeed impose on us a penalty for not actually attending the club, to take 
multi-vitamins daily, and to dine only in government-approved “health” 
restaurants.” Appellant’s Br. at 12. This claim, however, ignores the unique 
nature of the health insurance market.   
As explained above, the health insurance market faces a unique “cost 
shifting” problem, which causes prices in the health care market to behave in 
a counterintuitive manner. See Cost-Shifting at 2 (explaining that 
uncompensated care provided to the uninsured adds $410 to each individual 
insurance premium and $1,100 to each family premium). The laws of supply 
and demand dictate that a law that increased the number of people 
purchasing vitamins would also drive up the costs those vitamins. Likewise, 
a law adding more consumers to a health club’s membership rolls would 
drive up the cost of such memberships. Health insurance, by contrast, 
becomes more affordable when it is more widely purchased. Id. 
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Similarly, the national market for health clubs is not in danger of 
collapsing if Congress does not require people to join these clubs. Nor is 
there a risk that Americans will cease to be able to obtain multi-vitamins 
absent a law requiring the purchase of health supplements. The nation’s 
individual health insurance market, by contrast, is susceptible to complete 
collapse if people can wait until they are ill or injured to buy insurance. See 
Riding the Bull at 140 & 152 (describing the catastrophic consequences of 
enacting a preexisting conditions law without a minimum coverage 
provision in Kentucky and Washington); Maine’s Individual Health 
Insurance Market at 5 & 8 (describing same in Maine and New Hampshire).  
More importantly, there is no federal law which depends upon 
mandatory health club membership or mandatory vitamin purchases in order 
to function properly in the same way that the ACA’s preexisting conditions 
provision can only function properly in the presence of a minimum coverage 
provision. Accordingly, the Necessary and Proper Clause does not provide a 
constitutional basis for plaintiff’s hypothetical health care laws in the same 
way that it supports the minimum coverage provision. See Raich, 545 U.S. at 
38 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment) (“[T]he power to enact laws 
enabling effective regulation of interstate commerce can only be exercised in 
conjunction with congressional regulation of an interstate market, and it 
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extends only to those measures necessary to make the interstate regulation 
effective.” (emphasis added)). 
CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, amici respectfully submit that the Court 
should AFFIRM the decision of the district court. 
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